In a recent work, we have shown that it is not possible to dependably build any type of distributed f fault or intrusiontolerant system under the asynchronous model. This result follows from the fact that in an asynchronous environment one cannot guarantee that the system terminates its execution before the occurrence of more than the assumed number of faults.
INTRODUCTION
A distributed system built under the asynchronous model makes no timing assumptions about the operating environment: local processing and message deliveries may suffer arbitrary delays, and local clocks may present unbounded drift rates [9, 6] . Thus, in a (purely) asynchronous system one cannot guarantee that something will happen before a certain time.
Consider now that we want to build a dependable intrusiontolerant distributed system, i.e., a distributed system able to tolerate arbitrary faults, including malicious ones. Can we build such a system under the asynchronous model?
This question was partially answered, twenty years ago, by Fischer, Lynch and Paterson [7] , which proved that there is no deterministic protocol that solves the consensus problem in an asynchronous distributed system prone to even a single crash failure. This impossibility result (commonly known as FLP) has been extremely important, given that consensus lies at the heart of many practical problems, including membership, ordering of messages, atomic commitment, leader election, and atomic broadcast. In this way, FLP showed that the very attractive asynchronous model of computation is not sufficiently powerful to build certain types of fault-tolerant distributed protocols and applications.
What are then the minimum synchrony requirements to build a dependable intrusion-tolerant distributed system? If the system needs consensus (or equivalent primitives), then Chandra and Toueg [4] showed that consensus can be solved in asynchronous systems augmented with failure detectors (FDs). The main idea is that FDs operate under a more synchronous environment and can therefore offer a service (the failure detection service) with sufficient properties to allow consensus to be solved.
But what can one say about intrusion-tolerant asynchronous systems that do not need consensus? Obviously, they are not affected by the FLP result, but are they dependable?
Independently of the necessity of consensus-like primitives, we have recently shown that assuming a maximum number of f faulty nodes under the asynchronous model is dangerous. Given that an asynchronous system may have a potentially long execution time, there is no way of guar-anteeing exhaustion-safety, i.e., that no more than f faults will occur, specially in malicious environments [13] . Therefore, we can rephrase the above statement and say that the asynchronous model of computation is not sufficiently powerful to build any type of (exhaustion-safe) fault-tolerant distributed protocols and applications.
To achieve exhaustion-safety, the goal is to guarantee that the assumed number of faults is never violated. In this context, proactive recovery seems to be a very interesting approach [11] . The aim of proactive recovery is conceptually simple -components are periodically rejuvenated to remove the effects of malicious attacks/faults. If the rejuvenation is performed frequently often, then an adversary is unable to corrupt enough resources to break the system. Proactive recovery has been suggested in several contexts. For instance, it can be used to refresh cryptographic keys in order to prevent the disclosure of too many secrets [8, 16, 1, 15, 10] . It may also be utilized to restore the system code from a secure source to eliminate potential transformations carried out by an adversary [11, 3] .
Therefore, proactive recovery has the potential to support the construction of exhaustion-safe intrusion-tolerant distributed systems. But, in order to achieve this, proactive recovery needs to be architected under a model sufficiently strong that allows regular rejuvenation of the system. In fact, proactive recovery protocols (like FDs) typically require stronger environment assumptions (e.g., synchrony, security) than the rest of the system (i.e., the part that is proactively recovered).
This paper proposes proactive resilience -a new and more resilient approach to proactive recovery based on architectural hybridization [14] . We argue that the proactive recovery subsystem should be constructed in order to assure a synchronous and secure behavior, whereas the rest of the system may even be asynchronous.
We describe a generic Proactive Resilience Model (P RM ), which proposes to model the proactive recovery subsystem as an abstract component -the Proactive Recovery Wormhole (PRW). The PRW may have many instantiations depending on the application proactive recovery needs. Then, a design methodology under the P RM is presented and shown to be a way of building exhaustion-safe systems. Finally, we use this methodology to build an exhaustion-safe distributed f intrusion-tolerant secret sharing system, which makes use of a specific instantiation of the PRW targetting the secret sharing scenario [12] .
AN ARCHITECTURAL HYBRID MODEL FOR PROACTIVE RECOVERY
The main difficulty with proactive recovery is not the concept but its implementation -this mechanism is useful to periodically rejuvenate components and remove the effects of malicious attacks/failures, as long as it has timeliness guarantees. In fact, the rest of the system may even be completely asynchronous -only the proactive recovery mechanism needs synchronous execution.
This type of requirement make us believe that one of the possible approaches to dependably use proactive recovery, is to execute it in the context of a wormhole: a subsystem capable of providing a small set of services, with good properties (e.g., timeliness, security) that are otherwise not available in the rest of the system [14] . Wormholes must be kept small and simple to ensure the feasibility of building them with the expect trustworthy behavior. Moreover, their construction must be carefully planned to guarantee that they have access to all required resources when needed.
We propose the Proactive Resilience Model (P RM ) as a more resilient approach to proactive recovery based on a wormhole-enhanced architecturally hybrid distributed system model. The P RM defines that the architecture of a system enhanced with proactive recovery should be hybrid, i.e., divided in two parts: the proactive recovery subsystem and the payload system, the latter being proactively recovered by the former. Each of these two parts should be built under different timing assumptions and fault models.
The payload system executes the "normal" applications. Thus, the payload synchrony and fault model entirely depends on the applications executing in this part of the system. For instance, the payload may operate under an asynchronous Byzantine environment.
The proactive recovery subsystem executes the proactive recovery protocols that rejuvenate the applications running in the payload part. This subsystem is more demanding, by definition, in terms of timing and fault assumptions, but some of these assumptions depend on the specific proactive recovery protocol, which can be of many types. Thus, we chose to model the proactive recovery subsystem as an abstract component which allows many instantiations.
The Proactive Recovery Wormhole
The Proactive Recovery Wormhole (PRW) is an abstract secure real-time distributed component that aims to execute proactive recovery procedures.
The architecture of a system with a PRW is suggested in Figure 1 . An architecture with a PRW has a local module in some hosts, called the local PRW. Depending on the instantiation, these modules may or may not be interconnected by a control network. This set up of local PRWs optionally interconnected by the control network is collectively called the PRW. The PRW is used to execute proactive recovery procedures of applications running between participants in the hosts concerned, on any usual distributed system architecture (e.g., the Internet). We call the latter the payload system and network, to differentiate from the PRW part.
Conceptually, a local PRW should be considered to be a module inside a host, and separated from the OS. In practice, this conceptual separation between the local PRW and the OS can be achieved in several ways: (1) the local PRW can be implemented in a separate, tamper-proof hardware module (e.g., PC board) and so the separation is physical; (2) the local PRW can be implemented on the native hardware, with a virtual separation and shielding implemented in software, between the former and the OS processes.
The local PRWs are assumed to be fail-silent (they fail by crashing). Every local PRW preserves, by construction, the following property: P1 There exists a known upper bound T local execmax on the processing delays. As mentioned, a PRW instantiation may or may not have a control network. For instance, if a proactive recovery procedure only requires local information, then the control network is expendable. Even when the control network is required, its characteristics will depend on the specific requirements of the proactive recovery procedure.
The PRW offers a single service, defined as follows: Definition 1. Given any function F , with a calculated worst case execution time of TXmax, an execution interval TD, and a time interval (period) TP , satisfying TXmax < TD < TP , then F is triggered by the PRW periodic timely execution service at real time instants ti (the i-th triggering occurs at instant ti), with TD < ti − ti−1 ≤ TP , and F terminates within TD from ti, ∀i.
In short, the PRW has the ability to periodically execute well-defined functions in known bounded time. Moreover, the PRW allows the definition of a set of fail-safe measures to be triggered in certain situations. For instance, these fail-safe measures may shutdown the system if the periodic timely execution service fails to satisfy its specification.
A triple D, F, TP , TD , S defines a PRW instantiation, such that:
• D represents the set of data which is proactively recovered in all nodes; • F, TP , TD represents the function F which is periodically triggered with period TP and timely executed within TD of each triggering, through the periodic timely execution service, in all nodes. F makes operations over the data defined in D; • S represents the set of (optional) self-checking mechanisms, which have the goal of guaranteeing a fail-safe behaviour of all the nodes.
Building Exhaustion-Safe Intrusion-Tolerant Systems
In order to build an exhaustion-safe distributed f intrusiontolerant system, one has to guarantee that no more than f (accidental or malicious) faults occur during system execution. If the system maximum execution time is known, then one may choose a sufficient high f -by endowing the system with sufficient nodes -so that exhaustion never occurs. However, if the system has an unbounded execution time, we have a problem -it is not possible to estimate how many nodes will be needed to avoid exhaustion. One possible approach to solve this problem is to use the Proactive Resilience Model -enhance the system with a PRW in order that nodes are periodically and timely rejuvenated. Notice that this approach may even be applied in systems with a known bound on execution time when there is the need of minimizing the number of used nodes.
We propose a design methodology to build exhaustion-safe distributed f intrusion-tolerant systems, under the Proactive Resilience Model. The methodology has 3 steps.
1. Define the data D to rejuvenate, the rejuvenation procedure F , and calculate F 's worst case execution time (TXmax). Then, define the execution interval TD (greater than TXmax), and the periodicity TP (greater than TD). Finally, define the actions S to be performed if F is not executed with the required periodicity and execution time.
2. Build a PRW instantiation D, F, TP , TD , S .
• Notice that TP and TD may be increased if necessary. This will only impact the required faulttolerance degree, as explained in step 3.
3. Define the degree f saf e of fault-tolerance, such that, the minimum time necessary (T exhaust min ) for f saf e +1 faults to be produced satisfies the condition T exhaust min > TP + TD.
Given that at most f saf e faults are produced during any two consecutive rejuvenations, it is guaranteed that no more than f saf e faults will ever be produced at the same time during the entire execution of the system.
THE PROACTIVE SECRET SHARING WORMHOLE
Secret sharing schemes protect the confidentiality and integrity of secrets by distributing them over different locations. A secret sharing scheme transforms a secret s into n shares s1, s2, ..., sn which are distributed to n share-holders. In this way, the adversary has to attack multiple shareholders in order to learn or to destroy the secret. For instance, in a (k + 1, n)-threshold scheme, an adversary needs to compromise more than k share-holders to learn the secret, and corrupt at least n − k shares in order to destroy the same secret.
Various secret sharing schemes have been developed to satisfy different requirements. In this paper we use Shamir's scheme [12] to implement a (k + 1, n)-threshold scheme: given an integer valued secret s, pick a prime q which is bigger than both s and n. Randomly choose a1, a2, ..., a k from [0, q[ and set polynomial f (x) = (s + a1x + a2x 2 + ... + a k x k ) mod q. For i = 1, 2, ..., n, set the share si = f (i). The reconstruction of the secret can be done by having k + 1 participants providing their shares and using polynomial interpolation to compute s.
In many applications, a secret s may be required to be held in a secret-sharing manner by n share-holders for a long time. If at most k share-holders are corrupted throughout the entire lifetime of the secret, any (k + 1, n)-threshold scheme can be used. In certain environments, however, gradual break-ins into a subset of locations over a long period of time may be feasible for the adversary. If more than k share-holders are corrupted, s may be stolen. An obvious defense is to periodically refresh s, but this is not possible when s corresponds to inherently long-lived information (e.g., cryptographic root keys, legal documents).
Thus, what is actually required to protect the secrecy of the information is to be able to periodically renew the shares without changing the secret. Proactive secret sharing (PSS) was introduced in [8] in this context. In PSS, the lifetime of a secret is divided into multiple periods and shares are renewed periodically. In this way, corrupted shares will not accumulate over the entire lifetime of the secret since they are checked and corrected at the end of the period during which they have occurred. A (k + 1, n) proactive threshold scheme guarantees that the secret is not disclosed and can be recovered as long as at most k share-holders are corrupted during each period, while every share-holder may be corrupted multiple times in several periods.
The Proactive Secret Sharing Wormhole (PSSW) is an instantiation of the PRW presented in Section 2.1. The PSSW Algorithm 1 refresh() for each node Pi, i ∈ {1...n} 1:
{send δi(j) to each correct server Pj} 3: for j = 1 to n do 4:
if j = i and pf d(Pj) = correct then 5:
uij ← δi(j) mod q 6:
for l = 1 to Od + 1 do 7:
send uij to Pj {receive δj(i) from each correct server Pj} 8: for j = 1 to n do 9:
if j = i and pf d(Pj) = correct then 10:
receive uji from Pj {calculate the new share and erase the old one} 11: share ← share + (u1i + u2i + ... + uni)(mod q) 12: erase old share() targets distributed systems which are based on secret sharing and the goal of the PSSW is to periodically rejuvenate the secret share of each system node.
The PSSW is defined by DP SSW , FP SSW , SP SSW , such that:
• DP SSW = { share }, where share is the secret share to be periodically refreshed.
• FP SSW = refresh, TP , TD , where the refresh() function is presented as Algorithm 1, and is based on the share renewal scheme of [8] . Each process Pi, i ∈ {1..n}, executes Algorithm 1 at the beginning of the time periods defined by TP .
• SP SSW = {shutdown if share is not periodically and timely refreshed, as specified by TP and TD}. Robustness After all local PSSWs finish the algorithm execution, the new computed shares correspond to the initial secret (i.e., any subset of k + 1 of the new shares interpolate to the initial secret).
Secrecy An adversary that at any time knows no more than k shares learns nothing about the secret. Proof. Robustness and Secrecy are proved in [8] . Bounded execution time: Due to space limitations, we just give a brief intuition. Given that Algorithm 1 is executed in the context of the PSSW, there is a bound on local processing delays (Prop. P1). Moreover, by deploying an appropriated control network, it is also possible to guarantee a bound on network delivery delays. In such an environment, it is straightforward to implement a perfect failure detector pf d, such that, pf d(Pi) = correct iff Pi is not crashed, ∀Pi. Therefore, Texec max exists and can be calculated by combining the bounds on local processing and network delivery delays.
We now apply the methodology presented in the previous section, to build an exhaustion-safe distributed intrusiontolerant secret sharing system: Notice that in the secret sharing scenario, the degree of fault-tolerance (f saf e ) is represented by k. In the following section, we present an example of how this methodology can be applied in practice.
Experimental Results
We have implemented an experimental prototype of the PSSW using RTAI [5] , an operating system with real-time capabilities, and a switched Fast-Ethernet control network. The feasibility of achieving timeliness guarantees using this type of operating system and network is discussed in [2] . RTAI allows the construction of an architecturally hybrid execution environment, with the PSSW executing as a set of real-time tasks, and the normal applications executing at Linux user-level.
This section presents the results of a few experiments that we have conducted using this prototype, with the goal of observing the execution time of the refresh() function presented in Algorithm 1. Our experimental infrastructure was composed by 500 MHz PIII based PCs running RTAI, and interconnected by a 3COM SuperStack II Baseline switch. The experiences presented below used 32-bit shares. We are currently conducting more experiments with larger shares.
In the first experience we set k = 1 and tested configurations from 2 to 6 machines. The goal was to evaluate the overhead introduced when the number of machines increases. The results (mean, maximum and minimum execution time) are presented in Table 1 , and are based on 65535 periodic executions per configuration. The main conclusion is that the mean execution time increases with the number of machines used. This was expected given that more machines generate more messages and thus greater network and processing delays. However, the maximum execution time remains quite stable independently of the number of machines. This is very important and consolidates our conjecture that there exists an upper bound Texec max on the execution time. Moreover, these measurements also allow us to conclude that one could trigger a rejuvenation every 2 seconds with a maximum overhead of less than 2% (given that Texec max < 30ms, we could set TD = 40ms and TP = 2000ms). An adversary would have to obtain k + 1 = 2 shares in less than 2.1 seconds (≈ TP + TD) in order to reconstruct the protected secret.
The next step was to evaluate the impact of increasing k. Therefore, in the second experience, we used 6 machines to test the behaviour of the system with k varying between 1 and 5. The results are presented in Table 2 , and are also based on 65535 periodic executions per configuration. We see that there is a slight increment on the mean and maximum execution when k increases. This happens because the size of k only impacts on the processing delay. With such results, and setting k = 5, one can extend the previous conclusions and say that an adversary would have to Table 2 : Performance of the PSSW with 6 machines.
obtain 6 shares in less than 2.1 seconds in order to discover the secret. However, so much resilience may raise problems in terms of system performance. The overhead of periodically rejuvenating the system with intervals of 2 seconds is still less than 2%, but the same small window of vulnerability that limits malicious actions, also limits the actions of normal system applications. They need to do something useful in less than 2 seconds or they will never manage to use a consistent set of shares. So, there is a tradeoff between resilience and performance, which should be taken into account during system design. All these results are useful for the system architect to calculate the appropriate degree of fault-tolerance k. For instance, consider that an adversary A takes n seconds to discover n shares. Following the methodology presented in section 2.2, and if we set TP = 2sec and TD = 40ms, the degree k of fault-tolerance should be such that the time needed to discover k + 1 shares ((k + 1)sec) is greater than TP + TD (2.04sec). So, we conclude that k = 2 suffices to tolerate A's intrusions.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, we showed that it is not possible to build dependable intrusion-tolerant distributed systems under the asynchronous model, because they do not guarantee exhaustion-safety. Based on this finding and on the fact that proactive recovery protocols typically require stronger environment assumptions than the rest of the system, we proposed proactive resilience as a novel approach to proactive recovery that is based on an architectural hybrid distributed system model: the proactive recovery protocols are executed through a subsystem with "better" properties than the rest of the system.
The Proactive Resilience Model (P RM ) was presented and we showed that there exists a design methodology under the P RM allowing to build exhaustion-safe systems. This methodology was applied to the secret sharing scenario in order to derive an exhaustion-safe distributed intrusiontolerant secret sharing system.
We presented some experimental results that confirm our conjectures. Our experimental secret sharing prototype is intrusion-tolerant and, with a degree of fault-tolerance k ≥ 2, it can tolerate, with an overhead of less than 2%, any number of intrusions produced at the maximum rate of 1 intrusion per second, over the lifetime of the system.
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